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frontation Clause.
- Paula Elbich
Hilton v. South Carolina Public. Railway Commission: FEDERAL STATUTE IMPOSING LIABILITY ON
ST ATE-OWNED RAILROADS
FOR DAMAGES TO INJURED
EMPLOYEES ENFORCEABLE IN
STATE COURTS ONLY.
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission, 112 S. Ct. 560
(1991), the United States Supreme
Court held that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act continued to authorize
suits for damages against state-owned
railroads and was enforceable in state
courts, but not in federal courts. In
reaching its decision, the Court determined that a federally-based action
brought in state court did not abrogate
a State's immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because that
amendment has been held not to apply
to state courts. The Court's ruling
ensured that state-employed railroad
workers would have a forum in which
to redress work-related injuries.
The South Carolina Public Railways Commission, an agency of the
State of South Carolina, was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad. Kenneth Hilton, a
railroad worker, claimed to have been
injured while on the job due to the
negligence ofthe Commission. Under
South Carolina law, railroad workers
were excluded from coverage under
the workers' compensation statute.
Thus, in order to recover for his injuries, Hilton sued the Commission underthe remedial provisions ofthe Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
in a federal court.
While Hilton's case was pending,
the Supreme Court decided the case of
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483
U.S. 468 (1987), holding that a federal
statute which incorporated the remedial provisions of FELA, did not allow
a cause of action to be maintained

against a state agency in a federal court.
In light of this decision, Hilton dismissed his suit in federal court and
refiled in a South Carolina state court.
The state trial court dismissed Hilton's
claim, basing its decision upon a reading of Welch, together with the subsequent Supreme Court decision of Will
v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58(1989). Thetrialcourt
interpreted these cases as precluding a
FELA suit for damages against a state
agency, even if maintained in a state
forum. Hilton appealed and the state
supreme court aff"rrmed the lower court's
decision.
Reversing the state courts' decisions,
the United States Supreme Court drew
a sharp distinction between a FELA
based action maintained in a federal
court and one in a state court. The Court
recognized that a FELA action brought
in federal court implicated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm 'n, 112 S. ct. 560, 563 (1991).
Applying an Eleventh Amendment
analysis, the Court found that FELA
did not contain a clear expression of
congressional intent to abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and therefore, FELAactions could
not be maintained in a federal court. [d.
(citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 474-76).
Because the Eleventh Amendment
has been held not to apply to state
courts, the Court determined that a
FELA action brought in a state court
did not implicate any constitutional
rule of law. [d. at 565. Thus, Hilton
presented a case of pure statutory construction, which left the Court to decide
the issue ofwhether Congress, in enacting FELA, intended to create a cause of
action against the States to be enforced
in a state court. [d.
The Court re-examined its first interpretation of FELA in Parden v. Terminal Railway ofAlabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The
Court noted that in Parden the terms of
FELA were construed to mean that
when Congress used the phrase "[e]very
common carrier by railroad" to describe

the class of employers subject to
FELA's terms, it intended to include
state-owned railroads. Hilton, 112 S.
Ct. at 563 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at
187-88). The Court then reaffirmed
that interpretation, holding that FELA
continued to authorize suits for damages against state-owned railroads. [d
The Court concluded, however, that
the second part of its decision in
Parden, which held that by entering
the business of operating a railroad a
State waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in a federal court,
had been overturned by its subsequent
decision in Welch. [d. at 563. Thus,
the Court narrowed the issue presented
to whether FELA based actions could
be enforced in a state court.
The Commission contended that
this issue was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Will v.
Michigan Department ofState Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989). Hilton, 112 S. Ct.
at 565. In Will, the Court held that a
State is not a ''person'' suable under a
federal statute which lacked any "clear
statement" of congressional intent to
impose liability. [d. at 563 (citing Will,
491 U.S. at 58). The Commission
argued that the "clear statement" rule
should be read in context with the
Court's decision in Welch, that FELA
did not contain a clear statement of
congressional intent, to effectively
overturn the entire holding ofParden.

[d.
The Court disagreed, reasoning that
the "clear statement" rule should not
automatically be implemented when a
case did not involve an issue ofconstitutional interpretation. [d. at 565-66.
Instead, the Court categorized the clear
statement rule as a canon of statutory
construction in those cases which did
not implicate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. [d. In resolving a case of pure statutory construction, the Court found the doctrine of
stare decisis most compelling because
it promoted stability, predictability and
respect for judicial authority. [d. at
563-64. In the instant case, the Court
determined that the policy consider-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 22.3/I'he Law Forum - 27

ations for upholding Parden far outweighed the arguments for departure
from its original interpretation ofFELA
in 1964. Id. at 564.
The Court interpreted the fact that
Congress had not taken any action to
alter the Court's decision in the 28
years since Parden was decided as
meaning that the legislative branch
was in agreement with the holding. Id.
The Court also recognized that many
States had acted in reliance upon FELA
in drafting their workers' compensation statutes, so that overruling Parden
would require an extensive legislative
response to provide coverage to railroad workers. Id. Most importantly,
the Court noted that overruling Parden
would strip all FELA protection from
state-employed workers, leaving the
plaintiffin this case, Hilton, without a
forum to redress his work related injury.Id.
In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the
majority's overriding concern to leave
Hilton a forum to redress his injuries
caused the majority to misapply the
Court's previous decisions, which
would have clearly overruled the holding of Parden. Id. at 566, 570. The
dissent found no distinction to be made
between a federal or state forum when
a plaintiffbrought suit under a federal
statute. In both situations, the "clear
statement" rule enunciated in Will
should have been applied. Id. at 567.
Thus, based on the holding of Welch,
that FELA did not contain a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate State immunity, Justice O'Connor
argued that the Court should overturn
the remedial provisions of FELA and
affirm the state courts' decision in
Hilton. Id. As a result, O'Connor concluded that state legislatures would be
compelled to redraft statutes which
excluded railroad workers from coverage, in order to provide an alternative
remedy, and the plaintiff in this case
would be denied a remedy in a court of
law. Id. at 570.
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission, the Supreme
28 - The Law Forum/22.3

Court held that FELA created a cause
ofaction against state-owned railroads
to be enforced in state courts only. The
Court's decision left state-employed
railroad workers with a forum of recourse to redress work-related injuries.
It also avoided the possibility of requiring an extensive legislative redrafting of many state workers' compensation statutes, which exclude these workers from coverage because of the drafters' reliance upon previous Supreme
Court decisions.
- Linda M Googins
Willy v. Coastal Corp.: RULE 11
SANCTIONS UPHELD ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WAS SUBSEQUENTL Y FOUND TO LACK
JURISDICTION.
In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S.
Ct. 1076 (1992), a unanimous Court
concluded that Article III ofthe United
States Constitution was not violated
when a federal district court that lacked
subject matter jurisdiction imposed
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Those sanctions were of a collateral
concern to the case because the sanctioned behavior was unrelated to
Donald J. Willy's effort to convince
the federal district court that it lacked
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
determined that it did not raise the
issue ofa district court adjudicating the
merits of a "case or controversy" over
which it lacked jurisdiction.
Willy filed suit against Coastal Corporation ("Coastal") after he was discharged as in-house counsel. Willy
alleged that Coastal violated state and
federal environmental laws and that
Coastal tenninated his employment due
to his refusal to participate in these
alleged transgressions. Willy asserted
that the termination ofhis employment
by Coastal violated state and federal
laws, including ''whistleblower'' provisions.
Although Willy sued in Texas state
court, Coastal claimed that there was
original federal question jurisdiction

under Title 28, sections 1331 and 1441
of the United States Code. The case
was subsequently removed to federal
district court. Despite Willy's objections, the district court concluded that
it had subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court granted Coastal's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
and the court also dismissed the pendent state claims made by Willy. In
addition, the district court allowed
Coastal's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The court awarded Coastal
attorney's fees against Willy and his
attorney, jointly and severally.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court order
that dismissed Willy's claims and remanded the case to state court. It
concluded that the complaint did not
raise claims arising under federal law,
and thus, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court of
appeals, however, upheld the Rule 11
sanctions imposed by the district court,
and on remand the district court was
ordered to determine the appropriate
amount of attorneys' fees to be recovered by Coastal.
On the second appeal, the court
affirmed the district court's reassessment of the amount of attorney's fees
to be paid by Willy and his attorney.
The court of appeals also rejected
Willy's objection that the district court
did not have constitutional authority to
impose Rule 11 sanctions when it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
at 1078. The court stated that Rule 11
sanctions were within the inherent powers of all federal courts, and therefore,
the district court had appropriately exercised this power.
The United States Supreme Court
agreed with Willy's argument that in
the Rules Enabling Act and in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
"implicit premise ... [is] that rules of
practice and procedure are not necessary of disputes beyond the judicial
power conferred by Article III." [d. at
1078-79 (quoting Brief for Petitioner
at 28). Notwithstanding that premise,
the Court responded that this does not

